New Ventures in Financial Services

Focus on Payments and Mobile

Signature Debit is debt

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29 June

Death of Signature Debit

It’s hard for the banks to complain about yesterday’s Durbin caps. At $0.21 + 5bps, the caps provide no loss in revenue from a today’s average PIN Debit transaction (see yesterday’s blog). The loss is in Signature Debit. As I related in my post a few months ago, PIN Debit evolved from bank owned ATM networks while Signature Debit evolved from the card networks (and associated credit products).

ATM Networks grew as groups of banks banded together to monetize ATM infrastructure, and further expand network into the retail POS. This expansion led to further change from bank ownership to independence. The driver of any independent network is to add volume, nodes and services. ATM Networks evolved into PIN Debit Networks, with Visa’s 1987 contract to operate Interlink as the key milestone. Today, Pulse is owned by Discover, Star by First Data, Interlink by Visa (these 3 make up over 83% of PIN Debit Volume).

Visa was and has always been the leader in signature debit penetration, a look back at this 2003 article provides much insight into the history here. Most US consumers today don’t understand why their debit card has both a PIN and signature feature… many books could be written on this subject alone… but oddly enough consumers prefer PIN (see Pulse Federal Reserve Presentation 10/10).Federal Reserve PIN and Signature Debit Growth

 

Signature-based transactions currently have a lead on PIN Debit. In 2009, Fed reports signature as having 23.4 billion purchase transactions, and $837 billion of transaction value while PIN-based debit transactions totaled 14.5billion transactions, and $555 billion of transaction value.

However, PIN Debit enjoys a slightly higher growth rate (15.6% vs 14.3%), consumer preference (48% vs 34%), lower fraud rate (2009 fraud numbers: Signature $1.12B, $181M PIN debit card),  and obvious merchant preferences (interchange and fraud; 96% of PIN fraud losses assumed by issuers, vs 56% in Signature).

Retailer View

While yesterday’s announcement doesn’t impact average PIN debit rates (for average transaction), there are other elements of Durbin (routing and steering), which will eventually act to kill Signature Debit. Let’s first take a retailer view… Historically, retailers have been constrained in their attempts to deny signature debit transactions. Network agreements forced them to take “all cards”. The primary merchant “influence” mechanism was to default payment terminals to “enter PIN” and make it difficult to for a customer to use a signature debit card. While Durbin does not impact the “accept all cards” rule, it does allow for merchants to route debit transactions outside of the card network. When I spoke with a few of Visa’s institutional investors last week, much was made about 30% PIN debit penetration. Its very important to note that this penetration is on merchant terminals, NOT as a percentage of total payments. Small merchants remain rather ignorant of their payment options. This merchant financial literacy issue, combined with ISO sales incentives, has led to an uneven PIN Debit adoption.. but this will change not only for small merchants, but also for ONLINE transactions. PIN debit has had no traction in eCommerce because retail banks (issuers) did not want the lower interchange and refused to accept PIN transactions from online merchants. This has also changed. (I have detail here.. but can’t really discuss in the blog)

Bank View

At least 2 of the major banks in the US are working with processors to establish direct “BIN routing” and circumvent all network fees. This makes complete sense for the larger banks like bank of America, with 10%+ of US Debit volume, as it would enable them to eliminate network fees. Merchants would also benefit with a lower cost (the purpose of this routing provision). The key activity necessary to make this happen is to enable major processors to sort and redirect transactions. Processors already perform BIN lookup, but instead of going to Visa or MA with a BIN.. they will be going directly to a large bank. Obviously BAC/BAMS, JPM/Chase Paymenttech, FifthThird, …etc would be the top teams implementing this model. With Durbin at $0.21 + 5bps they actually can improve their margin on PIN debit.

Future

The obvious corollary here is that once a bank is successfully routing transactions directly from the processor(s), what Value does Visa bring at all?  1) Merchants that are not using a processor that has not yet implemented the bank direct routing 2) International Debit Transactions, 3) ?Signature debit bank agreements? As Bank “inertia” is directed toward maximizing bank margin, and merchants in decreasing debit processing costs, a new debit network is formed… and today’s Visa  debit network begins a slow death. First to go will be PIN debit, but closely following will be the removal of the Visa logo off of all debit cards. The 2 countries where this has happened are Canada (interact) and Australia (EFTPOS). The next phase of death will be begin when banks recognize the synergies of maintaining a common directory with centralized authorization and fraud controls. The model here for the US is SEPA Debit.

Tom’s Predictions (Market)

1) 2 major banks will launch their own PIN debit network… starting with processors they control

2) Signature debit, as we know it, will die

3) Visa and MA logo’s on debit cards will have a slow death over next 5-10 years, just as they have in Canada and Australia… and perhaps soon in EU (SEPA). With little impact to affluent customers in short term.

4) Card issuing banks will look for new ways to grow credit use. (Mobile payments, juicing rewards, educating consumers on unique Reg Z protections, …)

5)  Merchant will be testing models to tie incentives to debit use and even create new products (Target Redcard is model)

6) Retail banks will be pushing out low end mass market customers. Pre-paid business will pick up the slack. Most of the major banks have solid plans on pre-paid card deployment.. but have delayed launch because they don’t want to be seen circumventing Durbin (see below)

7) Processors will pick up new fee revenue for “least cost routing”, but regulators will be keeping an eye on them to ensure that the bank owned processors are not acting in concert to circumvent cap definitions (see below)

8) Online PIN debit will begin to take off

9) PIN Debit merchant adoption will start to accelerate in 1-2 years

10) Visa’s US transaction processing volume will stay steady. Debit volume will go down, but processing margin will improve and pre-paid will begin to take off.

11) Banks will begin to couple debit payments with incentives in an attempt to avert retailer led models.. Look for BAC to be the leader here.

What does this mean for Visa earnings?

My summary view is that Visa has plenty of runway on international credit growth.. but their trajectory now has much greater risk ask it will be tied almost exclusively to credit. Visa’s recent success in processing services (ie DPS) wont suffer short term as the top 5 banks have minimal services with them.. but we will see erosion of debit revenue beginning as transaction volume further accelerates to PIN debit routed outside of Visa’s network and PIN debit adoption in small merchants accelerates.

Per final regs –  75 75 FR 81722, 81731 (Dec. 28, 2010).

Pre-Paid

ii. An issuer replaces its debit cards with prepaid cards that are exempt from the interchange limits of §§ 235.3 and .4. The exempt prepaid cards are linked to its customers‘ transaction accounts and funds are swept from the transaction accounts to the prepaid accounts as needed to cover transactions made. Again, this arrangement is not per se circumvention or evasion, but may warrant additional supervisory scrutiny to determine whether the facts and circumstances constitute circumvention or evasion.

Processor Fees

Merchant commenters voiced concerns that issuers may attempt to circumvent the interchange fee standards (applicable to those fees ―established, charged, or received‖ by a network) by collectively setting fees and imposing those collectively set fees on acquirers, and ultimately merchants, through the networks‘ honor-all-cards rules. For example, the largest issuers may collectively determine to charge interchange transaction fees above the cap and effect this decision by dictating to each network the agreed upon amount. The network, then,would permit each issuer to charge that amount, and because merchants would be required to accept all the network‘s cards, merchants would pay the amount determined by the issuers.

Section 920(c)(8) of the EFTA defines the term ―interchange transaction fee‖ to mean ―any fee established, charged, or received by a payment card network . . . for the purpose of compensating an issuer for its involvement in an electronic debit transaction.‖ Accordingly, interchange transaction fees are not limited to those fees set by payment card networks. The term also includes any fee set by an issuer, but charged to acquirers (and effectively merchants) by virtue of the network determining each participant‘s settlement position. In determining each participant‘s settlement position, the network ―charges‖ the fee, although the fee ultimately is received by the issuer. An issuer, however, would be permitted to enter into arrangements with individual merchants or groups of merchants to charge fees, provided that any such fee is not established, charged, or received by a payment card network. The Board has added paragraph 2(j)-3 to the commentary to explain that fees set by an issuer, but charged by a payment card network are considered interchange transaction fees for purposes of this part. The Board plans to monitor whether collective fee setting is occurring and whether it is necessary to address collective fee setting or similar practices through the Board‘s anti-circumvention

Written by tomnoyes

July 2, 2011 at 1:48 pm

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Vendor Review: hyperWALLET Systems

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18 May 2010

I’ve been fairly negative on a few vendors lately. In the long term, Capital is attracted to success and growth and it is time to look at a few “successful” start ups.

Criteria for “success”:

  • Consumer Metrics (Active Customer Growth, Revenue)
  • Dependencies (Behavior, infrastructure, technology, …)
  • Value Proposition
  • Market Opportunity
  • Financials (Invested Capital, Burn Rate)
  • Competition
  • Ability to Execute (Team/Partnerships/Regulatory Issues)
  • Intellectual Property

hyperWALLET Systems

The first step in assessing any company is to look at their customer base and legacy. hyperWALLET is a 10 yr old private Canadian company that delivers both a software platform and payment network to over 200 companies and government agencies. They have references in telecommunication (Enstream), banking (HSBC, Canadian Banks and credit unions), Government (paylution), Commercial B2P payments (Monavie), Card (FIS, First Data, ..), online/mobile wallet, and are themselves a licensed money services business (in Canada).

The focus of hyperWALLET is payments to an individual, supporting payments from: another individual (P2P), a corporation (B2P) or government (G2P). The key issue in supporting payments to individuals is addressing lack of homogeneity in banking relationships and preferences. For example, an unbanked consumer may have preference for a pre-paid card or distribution through an agent network. Similarly a banked consumer may have preference for funds deposited directly in their bank, or split between banks depending on whether the payment is for dividends, commission or pension.

hyperWALLET has 2 businesses that support this focus: Platform and Network. Their platform provides white label payment services in either a license or hosted model. Allowing customers to “brand” payments and integrate into the online customer experience. For example, Canadian credit unions which allow customers to move funds to other banks internationally would have the “transfer funds” service as another tab to their existing online banking service. In addition to supporting white label, the platform upports 12 languages and 15 currencies in multiple channels (online, VRU, CSR and mobile phone). As an ex Oracle and ex Citi exec I couldn’t help but be impressed by the product design and architecture. Certainly a credit to the MIT educated CEO Lisa Shields.

The platform can serve as either the system of record for multiple products (ex. Card, ACH, Wallet, Airtime) or aggregate this information from other sources. For example, as a certified ISO 8583 issuing platform hyperWALLET can issue pre-paid cards and serve as processor, or it can integrate to systems from FIS, First Data (…etc.) and act as a program manager.  Another example is where hyperWALLET acts as an agent of the bank to provide customers with an “integrated” account view of card, ACH and other (Airtime, wallet, ..etc.) balances IN MULTIPLE CURRENCIES. Customer’s have the capability to turn these functions on and off in order to restrict functions based upon customer segment and location (regulatory regime).

The key barrier for HW’s competition is their payment network. By establishing banking relationships in over 40 countries over the last 10 years, HW can process both domestic and international payments through local ACH networks. This allows HW to centrally manage Treasury, and FX (thereby cost) which provides them with the capability for disruptive pricing. For readers of my previous blogs, I consistently credit PayPal and Cashedge for their payment operations teams. I now put hyperWALLET into this group and place them in the leader category from an international perspective. The HW team manages card, ACH, MSB, SWIFT, Agent networks, MNOs, and Wire across their broad customer portfolio (consumers, banks, corporates and government) for 40 core markets and their associated regulatory regimes. They even have a call center that speaks 12 languages.  Truly a rarified group.

The only companies that come close to offering this level of functionality are within commercial banks (Citi GTS, Deutsche, JPMorgan, HSBC GTB, Barclays GPU). Unfortunately for the banks, few are adapt at making their transaction services functions consumer friendly. Thus these institutions largely focus on the top end needs of large corporations, leaving everyone else to companies like hyperWALLET. 

HyperWALLET is a payments company in the hot spot of payments to consumers. They sell their platform to MNOs like Enstream as they lead Canada into mobile payments, and deliver cost effective global transfers through their Global clearing network in a way that allows individual consumers to manage where and how they get their funds. The deep payment expertise, and diverse customer base, leads them to rock solid product design based on real world problems.

HyperWALLET recently expanded its board of directors with the addition of Peter Burridge, former CEO of Travelex Global Business Payments and President of Seibel Asia Pacific and Japan. hyperWALLET’s CEO Lisa Shields is a leader in Canadian Payment community. In addition to her role as Co-Chair of the Canadian Payment Association meeting in June, and her 200+ customers, she is heavily involved in working to address the needs of the unbanked.

As you can tell, I’m quite high on this vendor. They are light on marketing and high on references, product, payment operations and thought leadership. The key market opportunities which will drive hyperWALLET are:

  • Pre-paid card
  • Mobile Money (from Enstream, Apple, Bharti, …)
  • Business payments to Consumers (dividends, commission, expense, …)
  • Government Payments to Consumers

Valuation

hyperWALLET is a private company with no published financials. As a payment network, they are classified within Payment Processors. Not withstanding the inflationary multiples from the Visa/CYBS transaction, companies within this group have average 2009 P/E multiples of 14.3, and 12.9 for 2010. Comparable acquisition transactions are listed below

Thus, I estimate hyperWALLETs current value between $70M and $120M

Written by tomnoyes

May 18, 2010 at 2:38 pm

3DS: Collaborative Path to Failure

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Very good paper on card fraud systems and the “collaborative path to failure” posted by Bruce Schneier. I trust you have read this one already.. .wow…
 
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/02/online_creditde.html
 
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/fc10vbvsecurecode.pdf
 
I won’t foget a meeting I had with Paul Baker, Mastercard’s global product head for MasterCard Secure Code (MA’s version of 3DS). When we told him that it was broken and not working and detailed the fraud that was getting through his response was “we just defined the standard, it is the issuers job to implement it correctly“, and that MA thought the requirements were “adequate” but “implementations were not”.
 
So the networks go to merchants with updated agreements, and incent them with discounts of up to 50bps, to adopt new (broken) standards, in turn they obtain a “liability shift” for CNP transactions. Banks like HSBC and Citi saw their fraud losses skyrocket from nothing (as they did not bear loss in a CNP transaction) to $10M+/mo. The issuing banks then began to “dial down” the approval threshold for all transactions (consumers transactions were being declined to manage fraud loss). What a terrible consumer experience… many lessons on “collaboration”. Networks must take ownership for integrity of the system.. although both Visa and MA have Payment Systems Integrity groups, individual banks a left with informal coordination methods to find source of data compromises.. In the states collaborative bank entities like Early Warning are taking the lead.
 
I hope to see a change of attitude by Visa/MA, because if they don’t take ownership of risk and integrity other networks will emerge.
 
– Tom

Written by tomnoyes

April 21, 2010 at 4:52 pm

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Apple’s NEW NFC Patent

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10 April 2010 (updated 14 April)

I’m still reading through the 243 page patent application… but this is exciting… not just because Apple is taking such an aggressive, broad approach.. but because Visa, MasterCard, ATT, … are also about to “pull the trigger” on some very substantive efforts. As a consumer I know that where there is competition… I win!

From a “payments perspective” Apple looks to be expanding the “iTunes wallet” to support NFC: either as an aggregated payment account (apple as issuer), or an “unaggregated” iTunes Prepaid Card model. In the aggregated model, someone like JPMorgan Chase may be the underlying bank and could provide Apple with an average margin of up to 150bps of TPV. This assumes that the NFC interchange holds at 300-350bps as Merchants are not jumping for joy in current pilots (see BestBuy).

In the “iTunes wallet as prepaid card” model Apple’s NFC revenue would be equal to TPV of ACH payments times the average interchange between POS transactions and other (ex P2P) transactions. Given that iPhone customers are rather Savy, I believe they will quickly educate themselves on the stronger Reg Z consumer protections associated with bank cards (as well as the existing rewards programs) keeping Apple’s interchange revenue suppressed to less then 20-50bps of POS TPV. We should not compare Apple to a “PayPal” as the transaction economics will be much different, given PayPal’s role as both issuer and acquirer. Also note that NFC value proposition is focused at the physical POS.

This is not to say that this will be a marginal business for Apple, in fact my view is the opposite, the real revenue streams to apple will not be from “interchange” but from advertising as  iAD provides the “Yang” to the NFC’s “Ying”. Creating a new payment ecosystem means having incented partners. The timing on Apple’s iAD and NFC developments are not accidental, my belief is that they are part of a very solid mCommerce expansion strategy. (note that the iTunes wallet is clearly evident from patent diagram 5A above).

My guess is that JPMorgan Chase and/or BAC will be a launch partner here, specifically on the “googlization” of financial services (see previous blog). The banks have a tremendous amount of data which can be monetized if consumers give permission. Both BAC and JPM have very aggressive exec teams focused on driving new business models. My guess at a value proposition: Consumer accepts a bank disclosure allowing use of your card data for mobile marketing (x ads per month), in return consumer receives rewards/ discounts/ offers.

On the iAD side, Apple will coordinate  iAD mobile advertising, banks provide “propensity to buy” information (for registered consumers) to Apple’s marketing engine, Apple will manage campaigns and share click revenue with banks. The revenue stream for Apple is in mobile advertising, developing a new ecosystem which will create a “win-win” for: consumers, banks and merchants, and Apple’s application development community.

Beyond near term NFC payment at the POS, many questions will arise on the openness of Apple’s NFC API within the iPhone architecture. Will Apple try to lock the wallet? If it is open Apple may loose control of the ecosystem as other “channel masters” emerge. Beyond payment at the POS, NFC/RFID has many applications.. from opening a door at a college campus.. to a price check on the RFID tag of  a new HDTV. I can’t imagine the strategy discussions going on in the Valley this week “What do we build”….

My messages for the start up community:

  • Better to ride a wave then create your own. Find a way to add short term value in this new ecosystem. Visa/AT&T are far ahead in coordinating a launch of products.
  • Network effects: volume, intelligence, routing, expand nodes, …
  • The iAD revenue stream. Find a way to become part of it. Integrating existing marketing programs (ex. NFC on a subway billboard).
  • Beyond the POS to mCommerce/physical confluence. How can you drive sales or store traffic? (ex. will apple integrate an RFID reader?)
  • Supporting banks. Example. Look at page 4 of patent application, taking an image of a credit card/check. How will a bank use this to make an authorization decision?
  • International. Apple has a tendency to design for US markets… what will it take to localize?

Apple’s approach to controlling its ecosystem is not perfect, but is the right thing to do early stage as both technology and consumer behavior evolve (I remember my Apple IIe). Right now my bet on “mobile wallet” is with Apple precisely because of their ability to orchestrate such an extended ecosystem. This is going to be hot, within the US there are currently 3 major competitive teams:

  • Apple (likely with JPM/BAC)
  • ATT/Visa/First Data (possible that they are aligned w/ Apple)
  • Citi/MasterCard (NFC Stickers)

Comments appreciated

Written by tomnoyes

April 12, 2010 at 3:51 pm

Posted in US

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Tyfone/First Data

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27 March 2010

When I evaluate companies, I look at the team first, business focus second and technology/platform third. Tyfone has one of the best technical teams in the NFC business led by Siva Narendra. Their product IP is just tremendous, resulting in a hardware platform that is in production and ready for market (a 5 year effort).

Tyfone’s micro-SD card is both NFC and MiFare (ISO 14443) compliant, meaning that in one device I “could” pay at every NFC POS reader AND go through every public transit (Oyster, Octopus, …) system. In other words, I buy this Micro-SD card, put it in my blackberry’s slot and now can wave my blackberry across POS terminals to pay a merchant and wave my blackberry on the UK Tube turnstile. “Could” is the operable word here as each payment network (including “closed loop” transit networks) holds the key to certification (and acceptance).

Tyfone’s partnership with First Data is key to addressing both Visa certification AND the 6 party fur ball which surrounds NFC. Why do I love these guys?

  • Team
  • IP
  • Hardware
  • Partnership
  • Flexible business model

Their competitors are: QCOM, handset manufacturers, bladox, …etc and perhaps (at the low end) NFC “sticker” providers like INSIDE. The “battle” in NFC is very complex as it extends into authentication, provisioning, device silicon, standards, certification, IP, POS … etc.  Obviously much heavy lifting remains to be done here, but my prediction is that the winner will be driven by a stellar team that is able to form the right alliances, with enough capital to ride through the storm. Their top challenge will be to stay focused on revenue generating opportunities and ignore (politely) the 100s of banks and transit teams looking to test their hardware.

The VISA/ATT NFC effort should kick start First Data in their role as Trusted Service Manager. I hope that my ATT store will be selling the Tyfone cards soon.. because I will certainly buy one.

Written by tomnoyes

March 26, 2010 at 1:21 pm

Posted in mobile payment

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$5B MNO Opportunity: KYC

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March 11, 2010 

If you had 30 seconds on the elevator with the CEO of any of the large MNOs, what would you say? I would tell them that they can uniquely address a substantial short term revenue opportunity with an authentication service (in existing customer base). How big? Addressable market is at least $5-10B with MNO revenue opportunity proportional to user/payment volume.

What drives this addressable market?  A: Fraud. Card fraud is big business (~$5.5B globally) for “bad guys” and so is stopping it.

Why MNOs? Unique capabilities with existing customers which can deliver short term revenue. Globally MNOs seem to be caught up in a brawl with banks and regulators in facilitating payments. For an MNO, why bother with the payment? If MNOs can manage risk (independent of payment type) then they have the potential to change the payments landscape and provide consumers (and merchants) with the ability to form new payment arrangements. If a consumer could be authenticated, then they no longer need to carry around any financial information with them…. account information could be managed separately. This is not a new concept (read virtual wallet). Past “wallet” failures were based upon a MNO model which attempted to “control access” AND “payment instruments”.  Alternatively, an “authentication” model would put MNOs into a role where they support existing processes and payment streams (rather then intermediate them) AND remove them from many of the regulatory hurdles which surround payments.

What are Key MNO Capabilities? Customer location, near real time customer communication, customer payment history, KYC, regular communication with customer, brand (trust greater then banks in most cases), handset (ex. Camera), merchant relationships, ability to incent customer, … etc.

Examples:

  • Globally, the most cost effective form of “authorization” my teams had ever rolled out was SMS based… A simple message to the customer providing a OTP. This model does not require MNO involvement, but could be substantially enhanced with additional MNO provided information (ex. Location, picture).
  • Verisign’s VIP and Arcot’s new OTP generator are great examples of the potential for the mobile phone to act as an authentication device… this kind of service has the potential to displace EMV/CAP (outside the US) and usher in changes in the US.
  • A non-card story comes to mind. CitiFin Japan had one of the coolest mobile applications I had ever seen: mobile account opening. The App took control of the handset camera so that the prospective customer could look into it and say “I accept the terms & conditions”. This would be a great generic service for MNOs.. for all types of “contracts”

Where to start?

In the US, the merchants are bearing the costs of card fraud and are highly incented to partner. The biggest merchant pain point is card not present (CNP) transactions. Getting the customer involved in authentication is a harder nut to crack, particularly when they bear no risk/costs (US Reg E/Z, and Fraud Liability Shift Whitepaper).

To get the ball rolling MNOs need to partner where the pain is (merchants) then incent consumers. Incentive costs should be borne by merchants through some combination of rewards, discounts or coupons. Another possible incentive is fear (identity theft.. don’t laugh have you seen Lifelock’s subscriber base?).  In my previous post (iPhone at POS? ) I touched on several elements which are critical.

Customer Experience? 

  • Having the mobile phone as part of the payment stream would result in the best (short term) customer experience, but would give the card networks new control (adding mobile number to card directory). I’m sure there are 100x permutations, but most would involve a customer interaction with the device to approve or verify.
  • ACH Push has plenty of examples where consumer presents mobile phone number to the merchant (as is done today in Nordics and PayBox) instead of your card.
  • In a “decoupled” authentication process, the merchant would ask to validate the consumer. Consumers are reluctant to give out their mobile numbers, so I would assume that the service may gain the most traction by making the party that stands to gain (merchants) do most of the work.  MNOs would develop an auth service where merchants would send a “validate” request to the MNO for a given payment type (many US merchants use an similar service for checks today: Telechek). Consumer would receive request and approve (prior to card authorization). The great thing here is that this request could also morph to take into account “context” of the validation request (ie. buyer/seller/new customer validation).

Example “future payment” process: Taking my cart full of groceries to the checkout counter of Tesco, the clerk gets my name and asks “would you  like to pay for this the same way you did last week”? I say sure.. and get a message on my phone with amount and store, validate with my PIN. Store recieves validation and processes order with my last payment instrument. I never had to open my wallet, and get a feeling that the store knows me… perhaps this is “back to the future” with the local corner grocery of 100 years ago (they knew their customers and cash was not always required). 

Summary

Authentication is a natural space for MNOs, and US merchants are screaming for help in managing $1.5+B in fraud. Unique MNO KYC capabilities could provide for many new revenue streams and accelerate an “mcommerce” world that expands beyond ring tones. In the US, we must find a way to leapfrog EMV, improve customer experience AND address the tremendous risks and fraud costs borne by merchants. Why should I carry around 8 cards and swipe for everything when 90% of merchants already have my payment information? MNOs have the opportunity to deliver compelling value and cement their position in customer interactions. Generating revenue from a “generic service” like authentication will likely require additional companies capable of consuming (and extending) it. Perhaps the mobile phone will be the “key” to trust portability (hey that rhymes) and link the virtual and physical world of commerce.

Related Links

Written by tomnoyes

March 11, 2010 at 5:38 pm

Posted in Analysis, US

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Comscore – US Mobile Market Share

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Comscore Report – March 8, 2010

Good report from a great company. The quality of Comscore’s data is just unbelievable. Though statistical sampling, they were able to predict my numbers at Citi to within 2%.. from balances, to users, to account openings. Its the best competitive information source I’ve ever dealt with.

– Tom

Written by tomnoyes

March 10, 2010 at 5:39 pm

Posted in Analysis