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Apple’s NEW NFC Patent

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10 April 2010 (updated 14 April)

I’m still reading through the 243 page patent application… but this is exciting… not just because Apple is taking such an aggressive, broad approach.. but because Visa, MasterCard, ATT, … are also about to “pull the trigger” on some very substantive efforts. As a consumer I know that where there is competition… I win!

From a “payments perspective” Apple looks to be expanding the “iTunes wallet” to support NFC: either as an aggregated payment account (apple as issuer), or an “unaggregated” iTunes Prepaid Card model. In the aggregated model, someone like JPMorgan Chase may be the underlying bank and could provide Apple with an average margin of up to 150bps of TPV. This assumes that the NFC interchange holds at 300-350bps as Merchants are not jumping for joy in current pilots (see BestBuy).

In the “iTunes wallet as prepaid card” model Apple’s NFC revenue would be equal to TPV of ACH payments times the average interchange between POS transactions and other (ex P2P) transactions. Given that iPhone customers are rather Savy, I believe they will quickly educate themselves on the stronger Reg Z consumer protections associated with bank cards (as well as the existing rewards programs) keeping Apple’s interchange revenue suppressed to less then 20-50bps of POS TPV. We should not compare Apple to a “PayPal” as the transaction economics will be much different, given PayPal’s role as both issuer and acquirer. Also note that NFC value proposition is focused at the physical POS.

This is not to say that this will be a marginal business for Apple, in fact my view is the opposite, the real revenue streams to apple will not be from “interchange” but from advertising as  iAD provides the “Yang” to the NFC’s “Ying”. Creating a new payment ecosystem means having incented partners. The timing on Apple’s iAD and NFC developments are not accidental, my belief is that they are part of a very solid mCommerce expansion strategy. (note that the iTunes wallet is clearly evident from patent diagram 5A above).

My guess is that JPMorgan Chase and/or BAC will be a launch partner here, specifically on the “googlization” of financial services (see previous blog). The banks have a tremendous amount of data which can be monetized if consumers give permission. Both BAC and JPM have very aggressive exec teams focused on driving new business models. My guess at a value proposition: Consumer accepts a bank disclosure allowing use of your card data for mobile marketing (x ads per month), in return consumer receives rewards/ discounts/ offers.

On the iAD side, Apple will coordinate  iAD mobile advertising, banks provide “propensity to buy” information (for registered consumers) to Apple’s marketing engine, Apple will manage campaigns and share click revenue with banks. The revenue stream for Apple is in mobile advertising, developing a new ecosystem which will create a “win-win” for: consumers, banks and merchants, and Apple’s application development community.

Beyond near term NFC payment at the POS, many questions will arise on the openness of Apple’s NFC API within the iPhone architecture. Will Apple try to lock the wallet? If it is open Apple may loose control of the ecosystem as other “channel masters” emerge. Beyond payment at the POS, NFC/RFID has many applications.. from opening a door at a college campus.. to a price check on the RFID tag of  a new HDTV. I can’t imagine the strategy discussions going on in the Valley this week “What do we build”….

My messages for the start up community:

  • Better to ride a wave then create your own. Find a way to add short term value in this new ecosystem. Visa/AT&T are far ahead in coordinating a launch of products.
  • Network effects: volume, intelligence, routing, expand nodes, …
  • The iAD revenue stream. Find a way to become part of it. Integrating existing marketing programs (ex. NFC on a subway billboard).
  • Beyond the POS to mCommerce/physical confluence. How can you drive sales or store traffic? (ex. will apple integrate an RFID reader?)
  • Supporting banks. Example. Look at page 4 of patent application, taking an image of a credit card/check. How will a bank use this to make an authorization decision?
  • International. Apple has a tendency to design for US markets… what will it take to localize?

Apple’s approach to controlling its ecosystem is not perfect, but is the right thing to do early stage as both technology and consumer behavior evolve (I remember my Apple IIe). Right now my bet on “mobile wallet” is with Apple precisely because of their ability to orchestrate such an extended ecosystem. This is going to be hot, within the US there are currently 3 major competitive teams:

  • Apple (likely with JPM/BAC)
  • ATT/Visa/First Data (possible that they are aligned w/ Apple)
  • Citi/MasterCard (NFC Stickers)

Comments appreciated

Written by tomnoyes

April 12, 2010 at 3:51 pm

Posted in US

Tagged with , , , , ,

$5B MNO Opportunity: KYC

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March 11, 2010 

If you had 30 seconds on the elevator with the CEO of any of the large MNOs, what would you say? I would tell them that they can uniquely address a substantial short term revenue opportunity with an authentication service (in existing customer base). How big? Addressable market is at least $5-10B with MNO revenue opportunity proportional to user/payment volume.

What drives this addressable market?  A: Fraud. Card fraud is big business (~$5.5B globally) for “bad guys” and so is stopping it.

Why MNOs? Unique capabilities with existing customers which can deliver short term revenue. Globally MNOs seem to be caught up in a brawl with banks and regulators in facilitating payments. For an MNO, why bother with the payment? If MNOs can manage risk (independent of payment type) then they have the potential to change the payments landscape and provide consumers (and merchants) with the ability to form new payment arrangements. If a consumer could be authenticated, then they no longer need to carry around any financial information with them…. account information could be managed separately. This is not a new concept (read virtual wallet). Past “wallet” failures were based upon a MNO model which attempted to “control access” AND “payment instruments”.  Alternatively, an “authentication” model would put MNOs into a role where they support existing processes and payment streams (rather then intermediate them) AND remove them from many of the regulatory hurdles which surround payments.

What are Key MNO Capabilities? Customer location, near real time customer communication, customer payment history, KYC, regular communication with customer, brand (trust greater then banks in most cases), handset (ex. Camera), merchant relationships, ability to incent customer, … etc.

Examples:

  • Globally, the most cost effective form of “authorization” my teams had ever rolled out was SMS based… A simple message to the customer providing a OTP. This model does not require MNO involvement, but could be substantially enhanced with additional MNO provided information (ex. Location, picture).
  • Verisign’s VIP and Arcot’s new OTP generator are great examples of the potential for the mobile phone to act as an authentication device… this kind of service has the potential to displace EMV/CAP (outside the US) and usher in changes in the US.
  • A non-card story comes to mind. CitiFin Japan had one of the coolest mobile applications I had ever seen: mobile account opening. The App took control of the handset camera so that the prospective customer could look into it and say “I accept the terms & conditions”. This would be a great generic service for MNOs.. for all types of “contracts”

Where to start?

In the US, the merchants are bearing the costs of card fraud and are highly incented to partner. The biggest merchant pain point is card not present (CNP) transactions. Getting the customer involved in authentication is a harder nut to crack, particularly when they bear no risk/costs (US Reg E/Z, and Fraud Liability Shift Whitepaper).

To get the ball rolling MNOs need to partner where the pain is (merchants) then incent consumers. Incentive costs should be borne by merchants through some combination of rewards, discounts or coupons. Another possible incentive is fear (identity theft.. don’t laugh have you seen Lifelock’s subscriber base?).  In my previous post (iPhone at POS? ) I touched on several elements which are critical.

Customer Experience? 

  • Having the mobile phone as part of the payment stream would result in the best (short term) customer experience, but would give the card networks new control (adding mobile number to card directory). I’m sure there are 100x permutations, but most would involve a customer interaction with the device to approve or verify.
  • ACH Push has plenty of examples where consumer presents mobile phone number to the merchant (as is done today in Nordics and PayBox) instead of your card.
  • In a “decoupled” authentication process, the merchant would ask to validate the consumer. Consumers are reluctant to give out their mobile numbers, so I would assume that the service may gain the most traction by making the party that stands to gain (merchants) do most of the work.  MNOs would develop an auth service where merchants would send a “validate” request to the MNO for a given payment type (many US merchants use an similar service for checks today: Telechek). Consumer would receive request and approve (prior to card authorization). The great thing here is that this request could also morph to take into account “context” of the validation request (ie. buyer/seller/new customer validation).

Example “future payment” process: Taking my cart full of groceries to the checkout counter of Tesco, the clerk gets my name and asks “would you  like to pay for this the same way you did last week”? I say sure.. and get a message on my phone with amount and store, validate with my PIN. Store recieves validation and processes order with my last payment instrument. I never had to open my wallet, and get a feeling that the store knows me… perhaps this is “back to the future” with the local corner grocery of 100 years ago (they knew their customers and cash was not always required). 

Summary

Authentication is a natural space for MNOs, and US merchants are screaming for help in managing $1.5+B in fraud. Unique MNO KYC capabilities could provide for many new revenue streams and accelerate an “mcommerce” world that expands beyond ring tones. In the US, we must find a way to leapfrog EMV, improve customer experience AND address the tremendous risks and fraud costs borne by merchants. Why should I carry around 8 cards and swipe for everything when 90% of merchants already have my payment information? MNOs have the opportunity to deliver compelling value and cement their position in customer interactions. Generating revenue from a “generic service” like authentication will likely require additional companies capable of consuming (and extending) it. Perhaps the mobile phone will be the “key” to trust portability (hey that rhymes) and link the virtual and physical world of commerce.

Related Links

Written by tomnoyes

March 11, 2010 at 5:38 pm

Posted in Analysis, US

Tagged with , , , , ,

SquareUp – Take 4

with 3 comments

27 January 2010 (updated 4March)

www.squareup.com

Venture Beat – SquareUp

New note from VentureBeat yesterday. Jack has certainly assembled a who’s who of angels. Given that these investors are proven winners I’m trying to guess whether they have “bet on the right horse” or have a plan that I’m not privy to (ex PayPal buyout). If it is the later, my educated guess is that prospects will let this bake for a few years before getting serious. There are too many issues which must be addressed for serious acquisition money to chase a customer convenience play.  Some of which I attempt describe below.

I understand that Jack’s vision for the company is to provide payment services to “craigslist” customers as the market place which will drive volume (an attempt to mimic the paypal/eBay synergy). His story is that everyone has a card in their pocket.. and merchants want to leverage this instrument without the burden of becoming a merchant in the network sense.

Of course Jack is competing with Cash and Checks in this pattern.. much different than the remote Card Not Present (CNP) world which PayPal attacked. I must say that many of my colleagues do not share my negative views on Square, and it has led to some very good conversations.  I certainly agree that issuers want SquareUp to succeed (read: interchange), and Square does have a very nice application, however my strong views are:

  1. There is no compelling consumer or merchant driver. Square will find that changing consumer payment behavior is much more challenging than social networking,
  2. Third party payment aggregation at POS is a moving out of favor with respect to network rules
  3. Fraud rates will be very high (see skimming video below) and bank issuers have ability to shut them down through authorization
  4. Volume will be low (merchant costs, competing methods of payment, charge back rules, …) and business will take at least 4 years to build (with sustained marketing).
  5. Competing bank/MNO sponsored “handset based” payments will overtake this approach in 2-3 years.

PayPal excelled because it addressed a clear gap in payments in a new marketplace where a 4 party system (merchant, consumer, merchant bank, issuing bank) could NOT adapt. This 4 party group, combined with the network and regulators, proved to be ineffective in responding to the “change” presented by online marketplaces.  PayPal did much heavy lifting, building “new rails” to manage merchants.  These eBay merchants were a well organized community which collaborated (generally speaking) and shared best practice. There was a REAL business problem in these pre-PayPal days..

Comparatively Square’s “Craigslist community” is not well organized, and the square payment method is competing with well entrenched behavior (check/cash, a 2 party system) in a person-person sale dominated by checks and cash. What is the problem that Square is attempting to address? My belief is that it is a convenience play, which will have  a much different adoption (and profitability model) then PayPal’s.

Top card issuers would love to see SquareUp succeed in order to drive cards (interchange revenue) further into cash replacement. However network rules (like PCI and merchant agreements) exist for a reason. Square’s approach to lowering the barrier for merchants (a valid market need) risks payment system integrity. In other words, the existing card merchant agreement process represents the rules by which the 4 party system has agreed to. If we take the SquareUp model to the extreme, what will stop every business from ditching their merchant agreement and start using square?  What benefits do acquirers/issuers and network have in supporting this model? Is the potential revenue upside for interchange (in cash replacement) vs. downside in fraud and lost revenue (merchant fees)?

SquareUp is acting as a third party payment aggregator (TPPA), a model which banks have adapted to since their experience with Paypal creating significant new rules and constraints (both ACH and Card). The network PCI rules (and certification process) for devices storing card information are also quite cumbersome, and require sponsor for certification. Perhaps this is why Square’s current customer agreement states:

You are responsible for all electronic communications sent to us or to any third party containing Account Data.

The acquirer that takes this on will likely have a few headaches when the first major craigslist merchant starts using the device to skim and resell card information (among other things). There is a reason for PCI compliance and for my “securing” my physical card and CVV. I can’t wait to see Square’s Payment Services Agreement (PSA). Operationally, the issuer’s have control over card authorization through systems like HNC’s Falcon or SAS Raptor. This means that if SquareUp is found to have contributed to a data loss, or has a high number of fraudulent transactions (see link) customer would see their card transaction declined, or the network (Visa/MC) would shut SquareUp down.

The great thing about the PayPal model is that the customer funded the account after agreeing to terms. In Square’s model, consumers are unregistered, Square is acting as an agent of the merchant. For Square’s investors, there is atypical risk which they will see through “unique” bonding/insurance requirements from the acquirer.  Just as with any company, Square will face unlimited liability associated with loss of consumer information (think TJX). To get an idea for potential mis-use see you tube video below.. crooks invest quite a bit in technology here… will SquareUp make it easier for every iPhone owner to become a skimmer?

The challenge any analyst has in assessing strategy is information. Given Square’s potential to drive electronic payments, either a card acquirer or PayPal interested … certainly a partner capable of managing the remote risk. If I were interested in acquiring, I would certainly let Square burn money gaining adoption,  changing consumer behavior, gaining approval from the networks, finding an acquirer and learning to manage the fraud issue… then if they are successful join in. At GartnerGroup we would call this approach  a  “late follower”. There is no revenue in this business for 3-5 years… my guess is that competing technologies like NFC will step all over this by that time… at least I HOPE SO!

Previous/Related Posts

https://finventures.wordpress.com/2009/12/02/squareup/

http://tomnoyes.wordpress.com/2010/01/26/usregs/

Written by tomnoyes

March 2, 2010 at 6:23 pm

Mobile Payment: “Picture This”

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23 February 2010 (updated 4 March)

Related Posts

For those that read my blog… I’ve been rather tough on mobile payment start ups run by execs that have no payment background (ex Obopay). Rather then continue to put vendors through the ringer (a penchant from my Gartner days), thought I would talk about something positive. Although I do disagree with most of SquareUp’s approach, I do agree that there is a market need for cash replacement and ease of use in a “Craigslist purchase”.  Banks and the cards networks are actively working to increase use of cards in this space, with the idea that everyone agrees with: enabling cell phones to be a cash register. Although banks and card networks love the idea of expanding card use, merchants have other options that are available today which present both substantially lower costs AND provide for improved fraud management.

USAA has such an application available today: Deposit@mobile and it is just fantastic.

In the background, USAA has integrated into the shared fraud database used by both Telechek and most of the banks (at the teller line). This provides the merchant with ability to see if check is valid, if drawn on a “good account” and assess fraud (among other things). This is what really impresses me… this is not JUST a slick application that was build by some non-bank. This application has solid risk management.  My only recommendation for USAA is to change the restaurant use case to a yard sale or Craigslist purchase. Other potential uses:

  • Any customer that receives any type of check in the mail… no more trips to the bank
  • Landlords
  • Small Merchants doing BIG sales (since it takes 90 seconds)
  • Yard sales/Flee markets/Craigslist purchase
  • People in remote locations (Farms, military bases, …)

Merchant benefits are substantial:

  • No transaction costs (savings of 150-350bps)
  • Simplified sign up
  • Same day availability of funds
  • Fits existing consumer behavior pattern (checks)
  • Instant verification, risk and fraud management
  • Leverages bank imaging systems and processes (regulatory and consumer receipt)
  • Notification/receipt to consumers

Other Vendors such as EasCorp’s Depozip provide similar functionality. Would love to hear from readers… As a buyer, which would you rather do? Let someone swipe your card or give them a check?

As a seller? Take a card (knowing that you bear fraud risk for 60 days) and bear costs of 150-350bps? Or take a check with instant availability of funds and a much more limited risk (no reg Z)?

Written by tomnoyes

February 23, 2010 at 4:31 pm

MPAYY

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mPayy Launches Free iPhone Mobile Payment App

12 January 2010

https://content.mpayy.com/pdf/merchant_integration_overview.pdf

Interesting effort by USBank, the key investor and  supplier of: technology, infrastructure, operations and Reg E compliance. Think of this as “merchant focused” paypal lite.. Sell merchants first.. (0 liability fraud) then try to get customers… Agreement states payment limit of $500 per MONTH. Banks have been trying to get moving with a paypal competitor for quite some time. Historically USBank has spent significant (well intentioned) effort in trying to get other banks involved in its efforts through groups like BITS, Payment Round Table, FSTC, … Given USBank’s majority investment here (rumored $5-7M) MPAYY may be able to patiently build the business through merchant integration.. (a long tough road). Paypal is well established in the CNP space, and their momentum is increasing…. it is tough to start any new payment type without a significant market driving adoption. Even today roughly 50% of paypal’s TPV is on e-Bay. MPAYY will be competing against a very well established team at paypal.

The paypal team is not only ramping up its merchant integration, with partners like Chase PaymenTech, it is broadening both consumer and merchant accounts internationally. Given USBank’s history, my guess is that they are making a strong play with other large US institutions to collaborate on a “paypal competitor”.

With respect to a “bank driven” mobile play (non card).. Cashedge is the clear leader watch here. With penetration into 60% of US Deposit accounts as the transfer service for: BAC, Wachovia, Citi, PNC, … Cashedge’s new POPMoney service will not only compete on P2P and Mobile.. but beyond.

For a bank friendly mobile “Card” play.. when will someone partner with Apple in putting NFC on the iPhone? Expect something soon.. VERY soon.

Written by tomnoyes

January 12, 2010 at 12:54 pm

Amex Revolution (update 4)

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Amex Acquires Revolution Money – $300MM (Update 4)

18 November 2009

QUICK Take Analysis

Company Website

Investor Webcast – Amex Acquisition

News

Customers
Card Holders: 300,000
Merchants: TBD
TPV (FY 2009 Estimate): $200M-$400M

Revenue (2009 Estimate)
Interchange:   $1.0M (Est 50bps)
Fees:                 $0.30M *Est
NRFF:               $0.60M *Est
Other:               $0.20M *Est
Total 2009 Rev:  $2.1M (Estimated)

Invested Capital
Series A – $10 (Estimate)
Series B – $50M 9/07 Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley, Ted Leonsis
Series C – $42M 4/09 Goldman Sachs, Steve Case, Ted Leonsis, David Pottruck, David Golden, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley.

Total Invested Capital: $112MM (Estimate)

Post Money Valuation – Series C $200M (April 09) *Est
Purchase Price: $300M (11/18/09 Press Release)

Deal Analysis
• 142.8 times Forward Revenue
• 2.68 times Invested Capital
• Profitability. Assuming ACH funding costs of 42bps, gross margin on TPV is less than 8bps. If consumer fees remain consistent,  and merchants bear marketing costs, break even is TPV of $1.9-2.5B (12x+  current TPV). Note PayPal TPV is $60B.

Bank License: First Bank & Trust
Partnerships: Chase Paymenttech, 5th 3rd

Business Overview

The most telling data on this business is from the conference call above. CEO said “I don’t know what the numbers are, and if I did I probably wouldn’t tell you”. Revolution efforts to date, and their value proposition, are heavily merchant focused.  Early vision was to own the rails and act as both issuer and acquirer. Realizing that this was too much to bite off for a small company they chose to focus on a platform and partner w/ acquirer, selecting the most cost effective network (PIN Debit) as “rails to ride”.

Revolution has “tested” the platform, a platform which provides unique cards that resemble US Bank’s existing PIN Debit (ATM) card plus some additional security features.  Given the break in their acquisition strategy, Revolution’s margins are extremely compressed, with merchants provided a flat 50bps MDR. All accounts are funded by ACH transfer and no interest is paid to customer on funds held.  Payments funded though ACH typically carry a flat processing fee, usually less than 25c (this represents cost of less than 40 bps on an average PayPal transaction of $62). By comparison, PayPal’s funding mix includes option for credit which carries funding cost of 200-250bps.

Under existing US regulations (Reg E/ Reg Z) merchants suffer heavily in losses on Card Not Present (CNP) fraudulent transactions.  Visa and MC networks have had challenges implementing improved CNP risk controls as 4 parties (issuer, acquirer, merchant, network) have very different incentives. Revolution’s enhanced security controls attempt to address merchant liability in CNP fraud , and could lower costs for merchant, and issuer (Revolution).

Consumer Fees

Analysis

  • 140x revenue represents a significant premium for a business model that has not proven itself, only “tested” its platform, requires substantial changes to consumer behavior, and leverages bank networks without providing bank incentives. It will take a 500%+ annual growth rate for this transaction to be accretive in a 5 year view with current pricing structure. American Express acquisition may be able to accelerate merchant growth, but marketing costs remain a challenge.
  • Current MDR and Consumer fee structure will likely remain until a TPV of $2-$3B to drive merchant adoption and offset merchant costs associated with integrating (and marketing) a new payment instrument.
  • Merchants may distrust AMEX intentions here as AMEX’s MDRs are among the highest of any payment type. Internally, AMEX will be challenged to allocate resources to Revolution’s given cannibalization issues surrounding fee structure. It may however, align with AMEX recent activity to form a deposit business.
  • Amex merchant connectivity may be able to provide the low cost rails that were initially envisioned in Revolution’s early business model. Internal incentives will prove challenging.
  • Price driven product. As the head of payments at a top 4 bank told me last week, what about this can I not do? The margins in this model have not driven earnings, and pricing will likely increase to support a sustainable business. A key element to pricing (and adoption) will be the degree to which merchants take ownership of marketing, loyalty and consumer adoption.
  • Companies like LifeLock have demonstrated that there are profitable consumer segments that care deeply about security. Uptake of Revolution money may be influence heavily by customer awareness. Under Reg E and Reg Z, maximum consumer liability for a fraudulent Credit Card transaction is $50. The liability for a PIN Debit is much different (note below). If consumers realize that their existing card liability is superior (then this instrument), it may impact adoption.
  • As with any new payment instrument, consumer adoption often proceeds much more gradually than predicted. PayPal solved a critical problem for an emerging market. Paypal’s ability to manage fraud and losses may justify their higher take rate (300-350bps), as the PIN debit model does not address merchant liability (see Chicago Fed Overview).
  • It is Critical that Chase Paymenttech stay engaged in merchant acquisition, as they are the leading acquirer for online merchants (addressing CNP issues).
  • (Aug 2010) learned that Revolution paid acquirers $1-$2M to integrate product.
  • Message to banks and issuers: set aside $10-$30M to invest in solutions to address CNP fraud.

Issues
Banks have invested enormous capital in building the ACH and PIN Debit (ATM) network, Revolution money leverages ACH to to fund their accounts, and then leverages the ATM PIN Debit network to conduct transactions. This flow of funds completely eliminates Debit card interchange revenue for “originating” banks (~150bps). Banks have not acted to date as current TPV is not of concern. In the event that TPV expands significantly, expect Bank involvement in restricting both the funding of accounts and use of PIN debit network. NACHA members have been very active in enforcing limits on clearing of non-bank payments, particularly if total transaction volume exceeds bank’s assets.

Non-bank money transfer services are typically a regulated activity. In addition to regulatory challenges, the unique regulatory environment (Reg E, 3rd party sender to ODFI) in the US may prohibit international expansion of this model. Another unique aspect to the US market is the card issuing business is typically separate from the merchant acquisition side (exceptions are American Express and Discover). Internationally, banks with both issuing and acquisition businesses are in a much better competitive position.

American Express will likely look to supplant role of Chase Paymenttech in merchant acquisition. Chase Paymenttech has several unique capabilities that will be challenging for AMEX to match. Look for AMEX to provide incentives for continued Chase Paymenttech involvement.

Value proposition is heavily merchant focused. Merchants may bear marketing costs to drive consumer adoption given the enormous cost benefits, however an integrated (merchant funded) marketing campaign will be challenged. Branding payments will eventually provoke a bank reaction. Paypal supported bank profitability through some interchange (50% funding mix w/ ACH). This model completely disintermediates banks (all while leveraging network in which they have influence/ownership).

Fraud does not typically attack a new payment system until it reaches critical mass, as fraud perpetrators must invest time to explore weaknesses and develop new tools. PayPal suffered losses of 7.4% of Revenue (over $300M gross fraud last year). This would obviously impact a business model with a margin of less then 10bps. The funding of the initial account is certainly a key weakness in this arrangement, as witnessed by both “direct banks” and transfer agents like Cashedge. Cashedge has a dedicated team of 30 risk analysts that have developed tools over 5 years to address fraud. See Mule Accounts.

Is the merchant value proposition strong enough that merchants will invest in building business teams that are capable of creating marketing and loyalty plans that can drive consumer adoption?

Written by tomnoyes

November 18, 2009 at 9:19 pm